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| 1 | SENATE RESOLUTION
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| 2 | WHEREAS, The drug industry funds 80% of the clinical trials | ||||||
| 3 | conducted for new drugs; and
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| 4 | WHEREAS, Drug companies have a history of designing | ||||||
| 5 | clinical trial research studies that by the nature of the | ||||||
| 6 | design favor a positive outcome for their product; and | ||||||
| 7 | WHEREAS, Two studies published in 2003 in the Journal of | ||||||
| 8 | the American Medical Association and the British Medical | ||||||
| 9 | Journal showed that the odds are 3.6 to 4 times greater that | ||||||
| 10 | commercially sponsored studies will favor the sponsor's | ||||||
| 11 | product than studies without commercial funding; and | ||||||
| 12 | WHEREAS, Drug companies have the untenable power to publish | ||||||
| 13 | only the data from clinical trials that they choose to publish; | ||||||
| 14 | and | ||||||
| 15 | WHEREAS, This power has led to the suppression of important | ||||||
| 16 | clinical trial data that warns of the health hazards and | ||||||
| 17 | limited efficacy of a number of drugs that have made it to the | ||||||
| 18 | market; and | ||||||
| 19 | WHEREAS, A number of drugs have been pulled from the market | ||||||
| 20 | or reevaluated for labeling after suppressed and new clinical | ||||||
| 21 | trial data has been made public, some examples include | ||||||
| 22 | Omniflox, an antibiotic pulled in 1992; Rezulin, a drug for | ||||||
| 23 | diabetes pulled in 2000; PPA, a decongestant pulled in 2000; | ||||||
| 24 | Fen Phen or Redux, a drug for weight loss pulled in 1997; | ||||||
| 25 | Vioxx, a drug for pain relief pulled in 2004; Paxil, Zoloft, | ||||||
| 26 | Effexor, and Lexipro, relabeled in 2004 for dangerous side | ||||||
| 27 | effects; and | ||||||
| 28 | WHEREAS, The suppression of clinical trial data continues | ||||||
| 29 | to create a national health crisis; and | ||||||
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| 1 | WHEREAS, The drug companies are profiting more than 3 times | ||||||
| 2 | the average of other Fortune 500 industries and have a | ||||||
| 3 | financial interest in producing and publishing only clinical | ||||||
| 4 | trial data that favors their products; and | ||||||
| 5 | WHEREAS, The prioritization of profit over scientific | ||||||
| 6 | integrity and public health is an egregious and | ||||||
| 7 | life-threatening practice; and | ||||||
| 8 | WHEREAS, There is a need for a public database that | ||||||
| 9 | registers all clinical trial studies being performed and that | ||||||
| 10 | publishes the results from those trials in a publicly | ||||||
| 11 | accessible database; and | ||||||
| 12 | WHEREAS, The FDA accepts roughly 200 million dollars | ||||||
| 13 | annually from the drug industry; and | ||||||
| 14 | WHEREAS, According to an article published in the Journal | ||||||
| 15 | of the American Medical Association in 2004, more than half of | ||||||
| 16 | the members on FDA expert advisory panels in charge of | ||||||
| 17 | approving drugs have direct financial interest in the drug or | ||||||
| 18 | topic they are evaluating; and | ||||||
| 19 | WHEREAS, The FDA cannot always be an objective body when | ||||||
| 20 | reviewing and monitoring drugs if it is so financially beholden | ||||||
| 21 | to the drug companies; and | ||||||
| 22 | WHEREAS, An internal FDA survey found that about two-thirds | ||||||
| 23 | of agency scientists are less than fully confident in the FDA's | ||||||
| 24 | monitoring of the safety of prescription drugs now being sold; | ||||||
| 25 | and | ||||||
| 26 | WHEREAS, The same survey found that more than one-third of | ||||||
| 27 | those scientists had some doubts about the process for | ||||||
| 28 | approving new drugs; and | ||||||
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| 1 | WHEREAS, Over the last 12 years, the FDA has slashed its | ||||||
| 2 | budget for monitoring adverse reactions to drugs already on the | ||||||
| 3 | market in favor of increasing its budget for approving drugs; | ||||||
| 4 | and | ||||||
| 5 | WHEREAS, The FDA approval time for drugs has decreased by | ||||||
| 6 | half in recent years, 27 months in 1993 and 14 months in 2001; | ||||||
| 7 | and | ||||||
| 8 | WHEREAS, The relaxed vigilance of drugs that are already on | ||||||
| 9 | the market and the increased rate of drug approval means that | ||||||
| 10 | more drugs are on the market and that less care is being taken | ||||||
| 11 | to ensure the efficacy and safety of these drugs; and | ||||||
| 12 | WHEREAS, The chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, GOP | ||||||
| 13 | Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, has suggested that an | ||||||
| 14 | independent board of drug safety may be needed to ensure the | ||||||
| 15 | safety of medications after FDA approval; and | ||||||
| 16 | WHEREAS, An independent board of drug safety with no ties | ||||||
| 17 | to the drug industry is essential to ensure the proper | ||||||
| 18 | monitoring of newly released drugs; and | ||||||
| 19 | WHEREAS, Having the FDA and drug industry in charge of the | ||||||
| 20 | current monitoring system, as is presently the case, presents a | ||||||
| 21 | direct conflict of interest, entrusting the very people who | ||||||
| 22 | developed, approved, and profit from the product with the | ||||||
| 23 | responsibility of reevaluating and pulling that product from | ||||||
| 24 | the market if warranted; and | ||||||
| 25 | WHEREAS, This drug safety board would have no involvement | ||||||
| 26 | in the original approval of drugs but would closely monitor | ||||||
| 27 | adverse drug reactions reported to their agency and would | ||||||
| 28 | conduct follow-up clinical trials on drugs whose safety has | ||||||
| 29 | been called into question; and | ||||||
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| 1 | WHEREAS, The present system is an established oligarchy | ||||||
| 2 | where the drug industry designs the studies, decides which | ||||||
| 3 | studies to publish, reaps the financial reward of the high | ||||||
| 4 | priced, heavily marketed drugs, and then takes responsibility | ||||||
| 5 | for judging the safety and efficacy of their product once it is | ||||||
| 6 | making millions in the marketplace; therefore, be it
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| 7 | RESOLVED, BY THE SENATE OF THE NINETY-FOURTH GENERAL | ||||||
| 8 | ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that we urge the President | ||||||
| 9 | of the United States, the Congress of the United States, and | ||||||
| 10 | the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to establish an | ||||||
| 11 | independent board of drug safety and a public database of all | ||||||
| 12 | clinical trial data to ensure that the safety and efficacy of | ||||||
| 13 | drugs that are sent to market and that stay on the market are | ||||||
| 14 | subject to the scrutiny of the public and doctors and | ||||||
| 15 | researchers who have no financial ties to the drug industry; | ||||||
| 16 | and be it further
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| 17 | RESOLVED, That suitable copies of this resolution be | ||||||
| 18 | delivered to the President of the United States, the President | ||||||
| 19 | pro tempore of the U.S. Senate, the Speaker of the U.S. House | ||||||
| 20 | of Representatives, the Director of the U.S. Food and Drug | ||||||
| 21 | Administration, and each member of the Illinois congressional | ||||||
| 22 | delegation.
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